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Revenge Porn and the First Amendment: Should 
Nonconsensual Distribution of Sexually Explicit 
Images Receive Constitutional Protection? 
Evan Ribot† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Like many issues related to relationships and sexuality, “revenge 
porn” has become more complicated—and its consequences more sinis-
ter—thanks to twenty-first century technology. Revenge porn, often re-
ferred to as nonconsensual pornography, involves the publication or dis-
tribution of sexually explicit images without the subject’s consent.1 This 
may include images obtained without consent, as well as images ini-
tially obtained with consent—often within the context of an intimate 
relationship—but later shared broadly or used as blackmail.2 The issue 
received increased public attention after a 2014 incident in which a 
hacker accessed and leaked sexually explicit photos of several celebri-
ties.3 But celebrities are far from the only victims: a 2016 study found 
that roughly one in twenty-five Americans have been threatened with 
or been the victim of nonconsensual image sharing.4 
The impact of revenge porn is deep for its victims because, even if 
they can bring their attackers to justice, the stain of the images or vid-
eos shared—especially if they circulate online—is hard to erase. Victims 
of revenge porn often face workplace discrimination or cyberstalking, 
 
 †  B.A. 2014, Harvard College; J.D. Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School. I 
would like to thank Professor David Strauss for his advice and feedback. I would also like to thank 
the current and former staff and board of The University of Chicago Legal Forum. 
 1 Danielle Keats Citron, Revenge Porn Should be a Crime in the U.S., CNN (Jan. 16, 2014), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/opinion/citron-revenge-porn/index.html [https://perma.cc/65P5-5 
RDQ]. 
 2 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 345, 346 (2014). 
 3 Nicole Darrah, Jennifer Lawrence, Kate Upton’s Nude Photo Hacker Sentenced to Prison, 
FOX NEWS (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/jennifer-lawrence-kate-upton 
s-nude-photo-hacker-sentenced-to-prison [https://perma.cc/4PL9-SLMY]. 
 4 Lori Janjigian, Nearly 10 Million Americans are Victims of Revenge Porn, Study Finds, BUS. 
INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/revenge-porn-study-nearly-10-million-
americans-are-victims-2016-12 [https://perma.cc/5RVL-FLPE]. 
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and many victims lose their jobs or struggle to gain employment be-
cause their sexually explicit images are readily available online.5 As un-
derstanding of the negative impacts of revenge porn has deepened, 
states have rushed to pass laws criminalizing the practice. To date, 
forty-six states as well as Washington, D.C., have enacted statutes ban-
ning the disclosure or distribution of sexually explicit images without 
the subject’s consent.6 Activists and scholars alike see the growth of 
state laws criminalizing revenge porn as healthy progress in addressing 
a phenomenon that existing laws lack the teeth to curb.7 
As revenge porn statutes spread, however, they face increasing re-
sistance from critics who claim the new laws run afoul of the First 
Amendment. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”8 Accordingly, the govern-
ment’s ability to restrict speech is limited, and if the government wants 
to impose a “content-based” restriction on speech, such a restriction 
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.9 Yet, 
First Amendment doctrine does not provide blanket protections for all 
speech, and some types of speech “can be regulated due to their propen-
sity to bring about serious harms and only slight contributions to First 
Amendment values.”10 Thus, proponents of strong criminal statutes 
against revenge porn seek to argue that nonconsensual pornography 
falls into one of the categorical exemptions of speech that does not gar-
ner the full protection of the First Amendment. Alternatively, drafters 
of statutes addressing nonconsensual pornography aim to demonstrate 
that these statutes can be carefully constructed to survive strict scru-
tiny. 
But two recent court decisions evaluating different state revenge 
porn statutes reveal the potential flaws in those approaches. In April 
2018, the Texas Court of Appeals struck down the state’s law prohibit-
ing “Unlawful Disclosure or Promotion of Intimate Visual Material” as 
overbroad under the First Amendment.11 The court reasoned that the 
law, which did not consider the intent of the person posting or sharing 
 
 5 Citron, supra note 1. 
 6 See 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER CIV. RTS. 
INITIATIVE (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/R 
63K-ZBK3]. 
 7 See Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 349. 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 9 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 374. 
 10 Id. at 375. 
 11 Andrea Zelinski, Texas “Revenge Porn” Law Struck Down by State Appeals Court, HOUS. 
CHRON. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/Texas-revenge-porn-la 
-struck-down-by-12848920.php [perma.cc/2TS6-7E44]. 
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the sexually explicit images, was not the least restrictive means of pre-
venting the dissemination of nonconsensual pornography.12 But in Au-
gust 2018, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the state’s statute 
banning “Disclosure of Sexually Explicit Images Without Consent” was 
constitutional.13 Although the Vermont Supreme Court declined to 
place revenge porn into a category of speech exempted from full First 
Amendment protection, it ruled that the state’s law did survive review 
under strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to advance a com-
pelling state interest.14 
This Comment will argue that revenge porn should be categorically 
exempt from the full protection of the First Amendment so that statutes 
restricting it need not withstand strict judicial scrutiny. As states con-
tinue to draft and litigate these statutes, it would be prudent for propo-
nents of criminalizing revenge porn to argue for an exemption from 
First Amendment protection for the distribution of nonconsensual por-
nography. Such arguments are in line with the historical expansion of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in understanding “low-value speech.” In 
fact, the call to exempt revenge porn from garnering constitutional pro-
tection mirrors the Supreme Court’s embrace of a First Amendment cat-
egorical exemption for child pornography in New York v. Ferber.15 More-
over, a categorical exemption for revenge porn from First Amendment 
protection will prevent proponents from having to define revenge porn 
under the “obscenity” exemption, which would limit the potency of re-
venge porn statutes. Finally, a categorical exemption for nonconsensual 
pornography will prevent these statutes from having to withstand strict 
scrutiny, a requirement which threatens to derail state efforts at curb-
ing revenge porn. 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF REVENGE PORN 
A.  Defining Revenge Porn and its Harms 
Revenge porn refers to the sharing and distribution of sexually ex-
plicit images or videos without the subject’s consent.16 This definition 
may include images obtained without consent, as well as images ini-
tially obtained with consent but with the expectation that they would 
remain private.17 It is often referred to as nonconsensual pornography 
 
 12 Ex Parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *7 (Tex. App. May 16, 2018). 
 13 State v. VanBuren, No. 16-253, 2018 WL 4177776, at *12 (Vt. Aug. 31, 2018). 
 14 Id. 
 15 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 16 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 346. 
 17 Id. 
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and is sometimes described as “involuntary porn” or “cyber rape.”18 That 
distinction in terminology, of course, “is one of motive, not effect: re-
venge porn is often intended to harass the victim, while any image that 
is circulated without the agreement of the subject is nonconsensual 
porn.”19 That is, an image or video need not be shared or posted by a 
former partner to constitute nonconsensual pornography, and the cir-
culation of images posted by hackers or individuals seeking to profit 
from them lack the “revenge” element that comes to mind in discussions 
of this issue. 
Regardless of whether the images are posted by a scorned ex, a 
hacker, or someone looking to blackmail the subject, the impact of re-
venge porn on the victim is deep. Due to the permanence and vastness 
of the internet, victims often struggle to escape the impact of their sex-
ually explicit images being circulated. Once an image is posted, it can 
reach hundreds of websites with ease, and even if a victim has “an im-
age scrubbed from one site, there’s no way to guarantee it hasn’t been 
copied, screenshotted, or stored on a cache somewhere.”20 This means 
that, at any given moment, a victim’s photos may be “only one email, 
Facebook post, or Google search away.”21 Further, rather than being a 
rare phenomenon, modern technology has allowed revenge porn to be-
come startlingly common: a 2016 study found that 4 percent of U.S. in-
ternet users—roughly 10.4 million people—have either had someone 
post an intimate image of them without their consent or threaten to do 
so.22 For women under thirty, that number rose to nearly 10 percent.23 
These images may be posted to websites devoted to revenge porn, but 
they often hit victims closer to home by being posted on social media 
and shared with friends and family. In January of 2017 alone, Facebook 
received more than 51,000 reports of revenge porn and disabled 14,000 
accounts in response.24 
Unsurprisingly, because revenge porn is fueled by technology, its 
impact is most deeply felt by younger people. A 2016 study showed that 
16 percent of American adults had sent a sexually explicit photo, and 
more than 20 percent had received one.25 More than 23 percent of those 
who had received nude photos reported sharing the images, and men 
 
 18 I will use “revenge porn” and “nonconsensual pornography” interchangeably throughout 
this Comment. 
 19 Charlotte Alter, ‘It’s Like Having an Incurable Disease’: Inside the Fight Against Revenge 
Porn, TIME (Jun. 13, 2017), http://time.com/4811561/revenge-porn/ [https://perma.cc/CE5H-4C9P]. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Janjigian, supra note 4. 
 23 Alter, supra note 19. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
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were twice as likely as women to do so.26 Young people—the generation 
most adept at using smartphones and modern technology—are increas-
ingly likely to send and receive sexually explicit texts, photos, or videos 
by cell phone, practices known as “sexting.”27 A 2015 survey found that 
nearly 40 percent of teenagers had posted or sent sexually suggestive 
messages, and that 24 percent of people between the ages of fourteen 
and seventeen and 33 percent of people between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-four engaged in nude sexting.28 Accordingly, revenge porn 
is a uniquely twenty-first century phenomenon that poses twenty-first 
century challenges to lawmakers looking to curb it. Stories in recent 
years of school officials and law enforcement discovering and trying to 
stomp out “sexting rings”—in publicized incidents in Virginia,29 New 
York,30 Colorado,31 and Connecticut32—are emblematic of the challenge 
nonconsensual pornography poses to a generation empowered to upload 
and share anything from their phone instantaneously. 
Older Americans may find the practice of sharing sexual photos 
within a relationship alarming, and critics sometimes dismiss victims 
of revenge porn for having created the content in the first place. But 
MIT professor Sherry Turkle explains that sexting is “embedded in 
modern relationships” in a way that does not trouble a generation of 
people who “grew up with a phone in [their] hand.”33 Although parents 
are often startled by the idea that their teenagers may be exchanging 
explicit images and videos, such practices are understood to be common 
within relationships in the digital age.34 Moreover, Carrie Goldberg, a 
New York lawyer profiled in The New Yorker as “the attorney fighting 
 
 26 Id. 
 27 Karen Thalacker, New “Revenge Porn” Law Could Snag Sexting Teens, DES MOINES REG. 
(July 10, 2017), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowa-view/2017/07/1 
0/new-revenge-porn-law-could-snag-sexting-teens/465718001/ [https://perma.cc/5B2H-C3HJ]. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Sexting Exposes Louisa Teens, THE CENT. VIRGINIAN (April 2, 2014), http://www.thecentralv 
irginian.com/sexting-exposes-louisa-teens/ [https://perma.cc/PX3J-HKTV]. 
 30 Kristine Thorne, Massive Sexting Scandal at Kings Park High School Leads to Dozens of 
Suspensions, Some Arrests, ABC7 (Nov. 9, 2015), https://abc7ny.com/news/massive-sexting-scan-
dal-at-long-island-high-school-leads-to-dozens-of-suspensions/1075927/ [https://perma.cc/DX53-A 
M4Z]. 
 31 The Associated Press, Colorado: No Charges for Students in Sexting Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/us/colorado-no-charges-for-students-in-sexting-cas 
e.html [https://perma.cc/CAU2-8W4P]. 
 32 Lorenzo Ferrigno, Newtown High School Students Charged in ‘Sexting’ Ring, CNN (Jan. 27, 
2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/27/us/connecticut-high-school-sexting-ring/index.html [https: 
//perma.cc/XT5Q-RVT6]. 
 33 Alter, supra note 19. 
 34 See Thalacker, supra note 27. 
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revenge porn,” suggests that sharing intimate material is “time-hon-
ored behavior” that is “often part of intimate communication.”35 The 
digital exchange of intimate images and videos, Goldberg suggests, re-
sembles the practice of soldiers deploying to war decades ago carrying 
pinup photographs of their wives and girlfriends.36 Goldberg also cites 
other invasive practices—such as voyeuristic upskirt videos, peephole 
videos, and other nonconsensual means of obtaining explicit images—
as a reminder that many victims of revenge porn did not consent to the 
creation of such images in the first place.37 Even when the creation of 
the image is consensual—as it often is within modern intimate relation-
ships—the nonconsensual distribution of the material harms its vic-
tims. 
It is also unsurprising that the victims of revenge porn are over-
whelmingly female. While women sometimes circulate images of men, 
studies show that the vast majority of nonconsensual pornography in-
volves images of women posted and shared by men.38 Some men admit 
to sharing these images out of anger or jealousy toward a former part-
ner, but for others, “[t]he dissemination of images can be as much about 
impressing other men as it is about humiliating the victim.”39 Addition-
ally, studies suggest that minorities and members of the LGBTQ com-
munity are more likely to be threatened with or victimized by revenge 
porn than the general population.40 Because of its disparate impact on 
women and members of other marginalized communities, activists and 
legal scholars alike have called for a more serious recognition of the is-
sue within the #MeToo Movement.41 Undoubtedly, the growth of the 
#MeToo Movement and heightened scrutiny surrounding sexual mis-
conduct has intensified the spotlight on revenge porn and accelerated 
legal and political discussions about how to approach the challenge. 
Now, activists seek to change how people discuss the phenomenon, say-
ing that revenge porn “should be called out for what it is: image-based 
 
 35 Margaret Talbot, The Attorney Fighting Revenge Porn, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 5, 2016), htt 
ps://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/05/the-attorney-fighting-revenge-porn [https://perma. 
cc/QR4M-PM65]. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See Alter, supra note 19.  
 39 Id. 
 40 See Janjigian, supra note 4. 
 41 See Leah Juliett, Why Revenge Porn Needs its Own #MeToo Movement, GLAMOUR (June 4, 
2018), https://www.glamour.com/story/why-revenge-porn-needs-its-own-metoo-movement [https:// 
perma.cc/EU67-547L]. 
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sexual abuse.”42 Within abusive relationships, the explicit images them-
selves can be “a form of domestic violence.”43 Abusers often use the 
threat of disclosing the material to pressure their victims into staying 
in a relationship and follow through on the threats when the victims 
leave.44 
Revenge porn’s connection to the #MeToo Movement is bolstered by 
the fact that its impact haunts victims in a way that is similar to sexual 
assault and other forms of sexual misconduct. Victims of revenge porn 
suffer professional consequences: once an explicit picture is posted 
online, a search of the victim’s name will display the image, meaning 
that many victims either lose their jobs or struggle to find employ-
ment.45 Especially in an age when employers screen job candidates’ 
online profiles throughout the hiring process, victims of nonconsensual 
pornography are deeply disadvantaged—and often permanently.46 As 
victims struggle to remove all traces of their explicit images from the 
internet, they have limited success in seeking employment because 
“employers do not want to hire individuals whose search results might 
reflect poorly on the employer.”47 Furthermore, revenge porn raises the 
risk that its victims will face offline stalking and physical attack, mean-
ing that victims often do not feel safe leaving their homes.48 Many vic-
tims report withdrawing from social settings, particularly from online 
engagement, where they shutter their social media profiles and back 
away from online networking, an essential tool of the internet age.49 
Revenge porn also leaves its victims with lasting trauma, as many vic-
tims suffer from panic attacks, depression, and other symptoms associ-
ated with post-traumatic stress disorder.50 Research from the End Re-
venge Porn campaign showed that 51 percent of revenge porn victims 
have had suicidal thoughts.51 These studies of victims and their stories 
paint a picture of revenge porn’s lasting—and often unavoidable—im-
pact. 
 
 42 Claire McGlynn, Call “Revenge Porn” What it is: Sexual Abuse, VOX (July 10, 2017), https:// 
www.vox.com/first-person/2017/7/8/15934434/rob-kardashian-blac-chyna-revenge-porn-abuse [htt 
ps://perma.cc/5NXV-W8E5]. 
 43 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 351. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Citron, supra note 1. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 352. 
 48 See Citron, supra note 1. 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Melanie Ehrenkranz, We Need to Study the Effects of Revenge Porn on Mental Health, 
GIZMODO (June 22, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/we-need-to-study-the-effects-of-revenge-porn-on-m 
ental-1823086576 [https://perma.cc/K5TS-HUNA]. 
 51 Id. 
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B.  The Growth of State Law 
As recent studies and news reports began to illuminate the scope 
of nonconsensual pornography and its harms, activists and legal schol-
ars began to call for states to criminalize the practice. Although coun-
tries around the globe—including Australia, Canada, Germany, and Is-
rael—had all passed laws criminalizing revenge porn by 2014, 
American jurisdictions were slower to approach the issue.52 One of the 
earliest and most significant calls to address the problem came from 
Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks in the Wake Forest Law 
Review in 2014.53 Their article details the revenge porn phenomenon, 
explains the shortcomings of civil law and the need to invoke criminal 
law to address it, and offers some guidance for states looking to square 
their approach in combating revenge porn with the limits of the First 
Amendment.54 This article is highly informative, and it reflects how per-
vasive the issue of nonconsensual pornography has become. When Cit-
ron and Franks first published their article, only six states had laws on 
the books criminalizing revenge porn.55 Today—just five years later—
forty-six states as well as Washington, D.C. have passed laws criminal-
izing the nonconsensual distribution of sexually explicit images.56 
Citron, Franks, and others who have written on the subject have 
offered guidelines for states to follow in drafting revenge porn laws that 
will effectively counter the practice without clashing with the First 
Amendment. Citron and Franks argue that a “narrowly crafted revenge 
porn criminal statute that protects the privacy of sexually explicit im-
ages can be reconciled with the First Amendment.”57 Accordingly, they 
recommend several careful drafting techniques for state legislators. 
First, they say revenge porn laws should explicitly clarify the perpetra-
tor’s mental state, possibly to require the defendant’s knowledge that 
the victim did not consent to the disclosure.58 However, Citron and 
Franks fear that revenge porn statutes that require intent to do harm 
or inflict emotional distress go too far and are not required by the First 
Amendment.59 Second, they suggest that statutes will better withstand 
 
 52 See Yifa Yaakov, Israeli Law Makes Revenge Porn a Sex Crime, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Jan. 
6, 2014), https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-law-labels-revenge-porn-a-sex-crime/ [https://perm 
ma.cc/Q2GS-B5EF]. 
 53 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 345. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 371. 
 56 46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 6. 
 57 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 376. 
 58 Id. at 387. 
 59 See id. (“Whether the person making the disclosure is motivated by a desire to harm a par-
ticular person, as opposed to a desire to entertain or generate profit, should be irrelevant”). 
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First Amendment challenges if they require proof that the victims suf-
fered harm and contain clear exemptions to protect disclosures regard-
ing matters of public interest.60 These suggestions address concerns 
that the First Amendment limits restrictions on speech that contribute 
to a matter of public importance without inflicting private harm. Fi-
nally, Citron, Franks, and others also note the importance of clearly 
defining the terms of the crime in state statutes to establish a clear un-
derstanding of what exactly a “sexually explicit” image is and what “dis-
closure” entails.61 Other authors addressing the subject recommend 
taking definitions of “intimate material” from existing federal law.62 
A survey of state revenge porn laws enacted within the last few 
years reveals the practical implications of recommendations from schol-
ars like Citron, Franks, and others.63 The enacted state laws reflect a 
messy legal landscape of nonconsensual pornography laws across the 
country and demonstrate the extraordinary challenge of defining and 
addressing the issue. While Citron and Franks argue against an intent 
requirement, the majority of state revenge porn laws include some “in-
tent to harass”64 or “intent to harm”65 requirement. Of the forty-seven 
enacted statutes, only twelve lack any sort of intent requirement. 
Twenty-seven of the statutes require that the victim have a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy”66 or that the parties “agree or understand”67 that 
the image was to remain private. This requirement is not necessarily 
the same as having knowledge that the victim has not consented, the 
mental state that Citron and Franks recommend; twenty-three of the 
statutes include a requirement that the defendant “knows or should 
have known”68 that the victim did not consent to the distribution of the 
image. Eight states adopted the recommendation to require that the 
victim actually suffer harm, while four others require that the action 
would “cause a reasonable person to suffer harm.”69 This haphazard na-
tional landscape reflects the difficulty legislators face in assessing the 
 
 60 Id. at 388. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Adrienne N. Kitchen, The Need to Criminalize Revenge Porn: How A Law Protecting 
Victims Can Avoid Running Afoul of the First Amendment, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 247, 284 (2015). 
 63 While this Comment is in no way intended to review or evaluate each state law on the books 
to date, it will discuss some significant laws to show relevant trends and point to potential 
strengths and shortcomings evident in different statutes. 
 64 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.472(1)(a) (2017). 
 65 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 2606(b)(1) (2015). 
 66 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101(a)(8) (2016). 
 67 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (2019). 
 68 See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/11-23.5(b)(3) (2015). 
 69 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 2606(b)(1) (2015). 
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pernicious—but still relatively new—challenges associated with re-
venge porn. The gaps in state laws create a few notable challenges. 
First, two state laws err in requiring some type of romantic rela-
tionship for the law to apply. Arkansas law mandates that the victim 
be “a family or household member of the actor or another person with 
whom the actor is in a current or former dating relationship.”70 Penn-
sylvania law requires an “intent to harass, annoy or alarm a current or 
former sexual or intimate partner.”71 The shortcomings of these two 
statutes should be evident: a victim need not have been in a sexual re-
lationship with the perpetrator in order to suffer from the lasting im-
pact of nonconsensual pornography. The Pennsylvania law seems to 
suggest that a victim’s angry ex could provide intimate images to a 
friend with instructions to share them with intent to cause harm, and 
the friend—who had never been an “intimate partner” of the victim—
could do so without punishment. These laws too narrowly portray the 
scope of nonconsensual pornography. 
Second, perhaps the most significant gray area between different 
state laws lies between requirements that the victim had an expectation 
that the image would remain private and that the defendant dissemi-
nated the image knowing that the victim did not consent. Citron and 
Franks focus only on the latter in their recommendations, suggesting 
that the perpetrator’s knowledge that the victim did not consent is the 
most effective way for state laws to establish the defendant’s mental 
state.72 There is ostensibly some overlap between knowledge that the 
victim did not consent to the distribution of sexually explicit images and 
the reasonable expectation that those images would remain private. Yet 
several state statutes include both requirements. Observing how those 
clauses work together as more cases of nonconsensual pornography 
come to the fore should illuminate the differences between these two 
requirements. 
Statutes that have neither an intent requirement nor a require-
ment that the defendant know that the victim has not consented might 
present First Amendment challenges. Georgia’s bizarre statute re-
quires that the dissemination of the image “is harassment or causes fi-
nancial loss to the depicted person and serves no legitimate purpose to 
the depicted person”73 but also says that a violation only occurs if the 
defendant, “knowing the content of a transmission or post, knowingly 
 
 70 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-314(a)(2) (2015). 
 71 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3131(a) (2014). 
 72 Citron & Franks, supra note 2, at 387. 
 73 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-90(b) (2015). 
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and without the consent of the depicted person”74 disseminates the im-
age. The defendant need not know that the victim has not consented 
but rather merely must knowingly post the image and know its con-
tent.75 First passed in 2015, Texas’s law required only that the defend-
ant disclose material “without the effective consent”76 of the victim. Ac-
cordingly, anyone who distributed nonconsensual pornography—even 
without any understanding of the circumstances in which it was created 
or any intent to do harm to the subject—became liable under the Texas 
statute. Laws like this are likely too broad to survive First Amendment 
challenges because they can be more narrowly tailored and because 
they treat defendants with intent to do harm and knowledge of a vic-
tim’s lack of consent no differently than they do defendants who 
thoughtlessly share an image. It should be no surprise, then, that the 
Texas revenge porn statute was successfully challenged in court. 
C.  Jones, VanBuren, and Lingering First Amendment Questions 
Texas’s law criminalizing revenge porn was passed in 2015, but the 
state’s Twelfth Court of Appeals struck it down in April 2018 in Ex 
Parte Jones.77 The Texas law made a defendant liable for disclosing in-
timate visual material “without the effective consent of the depicted 
person” when that material was obtained or created “under circum-
stances in which the depicted person had a reasonable expectation that 
the visual material would remain private” and the disclosure both 
caused harm to and revealed the identity of the victim.78 Notably, the 
statute included no requirement of intent to harm or knowledge that 
the victim did not consent to disclosure of the material. After being 
charged with unlawful disclosure of intimate visual material in viola-
tion of the statute, defendant Jordan Jones offered a pretrial applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the statute was unconsti-
tutional.79 Although the trial court denied his application, the Twelfth 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Texas revenge porn statute 
was an unconstitutional regulation of free speech that did not survive 
strict scrutiny review.80 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Georgia’s statute is one of three that alludes to financial hardships of victims, along with 
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The court rebuffed efforts from the Texas Attorney General’s office 
to reconsider its ruling.81 In an interview following the Twelfth Court of 
Appeals’ decision, Mary Anne Franks said that, even though the Texas 
statute was “not perfect,” the court “‘delivered a very poorly reasoned 
opinion that will hopefully be quickly reversed.’”82 Jones’s attorney, 
Houston First Amendment lawyer Mark Bennett, disagreed, arguing 
that “‘[i]f a statute restricts a real and substantial amount of protected 
speech, then it’s void.’”83 But lawyers defending the law for Texas’s Of-
fice of the State Prosecuting Attorney countered by emphasizing the 
limited contribution that revenge porn makes to the marketplace of 
ideas. As Texas attorney John Messinger explained, “[t]here is no ‘core 
political speech’ at risk here . . . the conduct prohibited by the statute—
violations of privacy of the most intimate kind—is not necessary or even 
helpful to a vibrant democracy.”84 
The Texas Twelfth Court of Appeals’ opinion squares with the no-
tion that a statute must be narrowly tailored in order to survive strict 
scrutiny analysis. The court described the statute’s broad reach in its 
strict scrutiny review with a hypothetical in which a man shares an 
explicit photo of an ex taken with the understanding it would remain 
private; after the vengeful ex shares the photo, it is shared again by 
others who do not recognize the victim and do not know that it was dis-
seminated without her consent.85 In this scenario, the court laments, all 
parties who share the photo can be charged under the Texas law, “de-
spite . . . having no knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the 
photograph’s creation or the depicted person’s privacy expectation.”86 
Thus, the court concluded that the statute created a prohibition of 
“alarming breadth” and did not survive strict scrutiny.87 However, just 
as Franks suggested that the Texas statute “could have been drafted 
more carefully,” the court here offered suggestions for improving the 
law.88 “At the very least,” the court reasoned, the law “could be nar-
rowed by requiring that the disclosing person have knowledge of the 
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circumstances giving rise to the depicted person’s privacy expecta-
tion.”89 
Following this legal defeat, the Texas House and Senate each voted 
unanimously to heed the court’s advice and revise the state’s revenge 
porn statute. The revised law, signed by Governor Greg Abbott on June 
15, 2019, includes a provision requiring the defendant to have intent to 
harm the victim and that that he or she “knows or has reason to believe 
that” the victim had a reasonable expectation the material would re-
main private.90 When unveiling the bill, State Rep. Mary Gonzalez said 
that the revisions were made “in order to make sure that unintended 
consequences, that people who might’ve accidentally received [an ex-
plicit image] and then continued to send it aren’t negatively im-
pacted.”91 
On the other hand, Vermont’s 2015 revenge porn law was upheld 
in August 2018 by the Vermont Supreme Court in State v. VanBuren.92 
The Vermont law makes it a crime to “knowingly disclose a visual image 
of an identifiable person who is nude or who is engaged in sexual con-
duct, without his or her consent, with the intent to harm, harass, intim-
idate, threaten, or coerce the person depicted, and the disclosure would 
cause a reasonable person to suffer harm.”93 Defendant Rebekah 
VanBuren was alleged to have accessed the Facebook account of a man 
she was romantically involved with and discovered messages of nude 
photos from complainant, an ex-girlfriend.94 The defendant told the 
complainant she was “going to ruin [her] and get revenge,” and posted 
the pictures on Facebook.95 The trial court granted the defendant’s mo-
tion to dismiss on the grounds that the Vermont statute was an uncon-
stitutional prohibition on free speech that did not withstand strict scru-
tiny, but the state’s supreme court reversed and upheld the statute.96 
Following the case, Defender General Matt Valerio said in an interview 
that the decision was “bizarre” and that his office is contemplating an 
appeal to the United States Supreme Court.97 
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Unlike the much broader law in Texas, the Vermont revenge porn 
statute withstood strict scrutiny analysis, as the court concluded that 
the law was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The 
Vermont court said that the state interest underlying the statute is 
compelling based on “the relatively low constitutional significance of 
speech relating to purely private matters, evidence of potentially severe 
harm to individuals arising from nonconsensual publication of intimate 
depictions of them, and a litany of analogous restrictions on speech that 
are generally viewed as uncontroversial and fully consistent with the 
[First Amendment].”98 While not denying that the restriction was “con-
tent-based,” the court compared the statute to others that prevent dis-
closure of private information surrounding health or finances and rea-
soned that the state’s interest in preventing nonconsensual disclosure 
of sexually explicit images is “at least as strong as its interest” in other 
disclosures, restrictions upon which are “uncontroversial and widely ac-
cepted as consistent with the First Amendment.”99 Said the court: 
In the constellation of privacy interests, it is difficult to imagine 
something more private than images depicting an individual en-
gaging in sexual conduct, or of a person’s genitals, anus, or pubic 
area, that the person has not consented to sharing publicly. The 
personal consequences of such profound personal violation and 
humiliation generally include, at a minimum, extreme emo-
tional distress.100 
Further, the court construed the statute’s requirement that the dis-
closure be made “knowingly” to require knowledge both of the act of 
disclosing and the absence of consent from the subject.101 By relying on 
this narrow construction, the court affirmed the statute’s intent while 
avoiding an interpretation of the law that would force a constitutional 
clash. 
Although the courts in Texas and Vermont performed a strict scru-
tiny analysis of their state’s respective revenge porn laws, the question 
of whether strict scrutiny review is unnecessary remains. The Texas 
court in Ex Parte Jones noted that content-based restrictions on speech 
survive only when confined to some traditional categories of unpro-
tected speech such as obscenity, defamation, fraud, and true threats.102 
Yet the state in Jones oddly conceded at oral argument that Texas’s 
statute was subject to strict scrutiny instead of arguing that it may 
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cover speech consistently categorized as unprotected.103 Then, on re-
hearing and in subsequent briefs, the State disregarded that concession 
and argued that the statute should be subject only to “intermediate 
scrutiny,” which would afford revenge porn less protection than “speech 
on pressing political questions.”104 Nonetheless, the court quickly 
brushed aside the idea that the speech targeted by the Texas law was 
obscene, saying that the statute “does not include language that would 
permit a trier of fact to determine that the visual material disclosed is 
obscene” and, even if it did, the statute would be “wholly redundant in 
light of Texas’s obscenity statutes.”105 Thus, the court spent little time 
on anything other than its strict scrutiny analysis, which it used to in-
validate the law. 
However, the Vermont court considered in much greater depth the 
possibility that revenge porn may not get full First Amendment protec-
tion, potentially creating an opening for new legal arguments on the 
issue. In VanBuren, the state argued its revenge porn statute could es-
cape strict scrutiny because it “categorically regulates obscenity.”106 The 
court was not persuaded because “a state’s interest in regulating ob-
scenity relates to protecting the sensibilities of those exposed to obscene 
works, as opposed to, for example, protecting the privacy or integrity of 
the models or actors depicted in obscene images.”107 In other words, ob-
scenity receives less robust First Amendment protection than other 
speech because of its ability to offend unwilling recipients of obscene 
speech, whereas revenge porn laws aim to protect the privacy and safety 
of unwilling subjects. In dismissing the attempt to label revenge porn 
as obscenity, the court offered a potentially useful hint: “Vermont’s stat-
ute is more analogous to the restrictions on child pornography that the 
Supreme Court has likewise categorically excluded from full First 
Amendment protection.”108 
Similarly, the court dismissed Vermont’s argument to carve out a 
new category of unprotected speech for revenge porn as an extreme in-
vasion of privacy. The court detailed favorably the argument that “non-
consensual pornography seems to be a strong candidate for categorical 
exclusion from full First Amendment protections” based on precedent 
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supporting the government’s ability to regulate speech about purely pri-
vate matters.109 Nonetheless, the court declined to offer such a categor-
ical rule about nonconsensual pornography based on the Supreme 
Court’s “emphatic rejection of attempts to name previously unrecog-
nized categories, and the oft-repeated reluctance of the Supreme Court 
to adopt broad rules dealing with state regulations protecting individ-
ual privacy as they relate to free speech.”110 Ultimately, the court wrote, 
“we leave it to the Supreme Court in the first instance to designate non-
consensual pornography as a new category of speech that falls outside 
the First Amendment’s full protections.”111 
III. CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION FOR 
REVENGE PORN 
Although they reached different conclusions in assessing their re-
spective states’ revenge porn laws, the courts in Texas and Vermont 
each declined to categorically exempt revenge porn from the protection 
of the First Amendment. The court in Texas was brief in its assessment 
of the issue, as the state mostly conceded the point: “[n]ew categories of 
unprotected speech may not be added to the list based on a conclusion 
that certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”112 The Vermont Su-
preme Court gave more credence to the idea but nonetheless “decline[d] 
to predict” that the Supreme Court would create a new categorical First 
Amendment exemption for revenge porn.113 The court based this deci-
sion primarily on United States v. Stevens,114 where the Supreme Court 
decided not to recognize a new category outside the First Amendment’s 
full protection for depictions of animal cruelty. This decision was based 
largely on the lack of historical regulation of such a category of speech 
rather than on policy arguments for the proposed category.115 
While both courts may have been rightly reluctant to step ahead of 
the Supreme Court—and while the Vermont Supreme Court explicitly 
suggested the Supreme Court may take a different approach—revenge 
porn can and should properly be characterized as low-value speech de-
manding a categorical First Amendment exemption. If given the oppor-
tunity to consider the issue, the Supreme Court should create a cate-
gorical exemption for statutes criminalizing revenge pornography. To 
do so would not depart from the Court’s historical approach to First 
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Amendment exemptions—despite its holding in Stevens—and would 
properly categorize revenge porn as low value. Indeed, a First Amend-
ment exemption for nonconsensual pornography could operate like the 
exemption the Supreme Court created for child pornography in Ferber. 
Without such an exemption, revenge porn statutes will face an uphill 
battle either to be categorized as obscenity or to survive strict scrutiny 
when challenged. 
A.  The History of Categorical Exemptions for Low-Value Speech 
While the courts in Jones and VanBuren treated First Amendment 
categorical exemptions as stagnant and rooted only in history, a thor-
ough historical analysis reveals this is not the case. In a 2015 article, 
Genevieve Lakier challenged the prevailing assumption that the exist-
ence of the “low-value” categories of speech—such as obscenity, libel, 
and true threats—have been fixed throughout American history.116 In 
fact, Lakier noted, from the country’s founding through the nineteenth 
century, courts extended significant First Amendment protection to 
many categories of speech that would later be recognized as low 
value.117 It was not until the 1930s and 1940s that the Supreme Court 
began to broadly categorize high-value and low-value speech, and even 
when the court did make such distinctions, it “relied very little on his-
torical precedent to actually define the low-value categories.”118 Nor did 
the Supreme Court decide whether to identify new categories of low-
value speech solely based on historical considerations; its decisions on 
which categories of speech demand full First Amendment protections 
have long been “functional, rather than historical.”119 
This history makes the Supreme Court’s assertion in Stevens, that 
new categories of low-value speech cannot be created absent a “long-
settled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation,” dubious at 
best.120 The Vermont Supreme Court quoted Stevens in “rejecting the 
notion that the court has ‘freewheeling authority to declare new catego-
ries of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.’”121 In Jones, 
Texas’s Twelfth Court of Appeals cited the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association122 to support the idea 
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that new categories of unprotected speech cannot simply be created be-
cause the legislature concludes they are harmful, an idea that Brown 
attributed to Stevens.123 Thus, it is clear that the reasoning behind Ste-
vens has contributed to courts’ reluctance to offer a First Amendment 
exemption to revenge porn. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Stevens 
leaves open the possibility of creating new categories of low-value 
speech “that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been 
specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.”124 
Within that framework, Stevens is better understood not as fore-
closing the possibility of new First Amendment categorical exemptions 
but instead as suggesting that depictions of animal cruelty do not war-
rant the creation of one. In Stevens, the government sought to defend a 
statute prohibiting visual and auditory depictions of “conduct in which 
a living animal is intentionally harmed.”125 It argued that, because “de-
pictions of illegal acts of animal cruelty . . . necessarily lack expressive 
value,” such speech should be added to the list of categorical exemptions 
to First Amendment protection.126 The Court rejected the government’s 
proposition that categorical exclusions be considered “under a simple 
balancing test” of whether the value of the speech outweighs its societal 
costs: 
As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that [bal-
ancing test] is startling and dangerous. The First Amendment’s 
guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of 
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs 
and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by 
the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the 
Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any 
attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some 
speech is not worth it.127 
This passage suggests that balancing tests alone are insufficient 
grounds for creating First Amendment categorical exemptions because 
they “allow[ ] judges to impose their own values onto the Constitu-
tion.”128 While the Court acknowledged that the notion of a balance of 
harms has “descriptive” value in identifying types of exempt expression, 
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such a balancing test is insufficient on its own to determine such cate-
gorical exemptions.129 Instead, the Court noted that its exemptions have 
arisen from “special case[s]” in which the speech was “intrinsically re-
lated” to an underlying harm.130 Although the Court stressed the lack 
of historical regulation of speech depicting animal cruelty to reject the 
government’s proposed balancing test, assessments of categorical ex-
emptions must focus on whether the speech in question is integral to a 
harm the state seeks to eliminate. In Stevens, the Court did not find the 
link between depictions of animal cruelty and the harms of animal cru-
elty itself sufficient to warrant a First Amendment categorical exemp-
tion.131 However, it noted that it “need not foreclose the future recogni-
tion of such additional categories to reject the Government’s highly 
manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them.”132 
Thus, although courts in Vermont and Texas relied on Stevens to 
support the contention that the Supreme Court will not create new First 
Amendment exemptions without historical precedent, the Court’s rea-
soning in Stevens should be limited to the issue it confronted there. The 
depiction of animal cruelty is simply not a strong analogue for noncon-
sensual pornography. The government’s proposition in Stevens that de-
pictions of animal cruelty “necessarily lack expressive value” is similar 
to the claim made by Texas lawyers insisting that revenge porn is not 
“entitled to the highest level of protection afforded by the First Amend-
ment” because it “is not essential for the marketplace of ideas to func-
tion properly.”133 A clear understanding of Stevens suggests that this 
argument is misplaced. Instead of focusing on “expressive value,” the 
strongest argument to establish a categorical exemption for revenge 
porn is the intrinsic link between its distribution and the infliction of 
permanent and repeated harm upon its victims. Because a categorical 
exemption for revenge porn would look quite different from the one the 
Supreme Court considered in Stevens, the invocation of Stevens in Jones 
and VanBuren may be misguided. Nonetheless, it is understandable 
that lower courts would hesitate to create a new First Amendment cat-
egorical exemption without Supreme Court guidance, so it is not unrea-
sonable that the Vermont Supreme Court elected to “leave it to the Su-
preme Court.”134 
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B.  First Amendment Parallels Between Revenge Porn and Child Por-
nography 
The need to create a First Amendment categorical exemption for 
revenge porn is similar to the recognized exemption for child pornogra-
phy. Despite the potential roadblock presented in Stevens, the Supreme 
Court has latitude to identify categories of speech that are newly ex-
empt from First Amendment protection based on the connection be-
tween the speech and its underlying harms. Thus, the Supreme Court 
could carve out an exemption for nonconsensual pornography much like 
it did for child pornography in New York v. Ferber.135 In Ferber, the pro-
prietor of a bookstore specializing in sexual materials claimed that a 
statute banning the dissemination of child pornography violated the 
First Amendment.136 The Court wrote that “[r]ecognizing and classify-
ing child pornography as a category of material outside the protection 
of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier deci-
sions.”137 Just as Lakier’s article suggests, the Court’s approach in up-
holding a law criminalizing child pornography was rooted in practical 
considerations, not entrenched history.138 The Court supported this cat-
egorical exemption—and could do so again—by noting that “the evil to 
be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if 
any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is re-
quired.”139 Child pornography does not earn full First Amendment pro-
tection because it “bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of 
children engaged in its production,” so “the balance of competing inter-
ests is clearly struck.”140 
But Ferber’s creation of a categorical exemption for child pornogra-
phy is rooted not merely in the danger of the speech itself but rather in 
the relationship between the dissemination of child pornography and 
its ongoing harms. As the Court explained: 
The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual ac-
tivity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of 
children in at least two ways. First, the materials produced are 
a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm 
to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second, the dis-
tribution network for child pornography must be closed if the 
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production of material which requires the sexual exploitation of 
children is to be effectively controlled.141 
Thus, laws prohibiting the distribution of child pornography ad-
dress two distinct harms of that speech: the harm from creating the 
video, during which a child is forced to engage in sexual activity, and 
the harm from the dissemination and the “permanent record” of the ma-
terial. In that sense, the distribution of images or videos is a part of the 
abuse itself, which means banning that distribution is essential to curb-
ing child sexual abuse. Notably, the depictions of animal abuse consid-
ered in Stevens do not present this brand of harm, as the dissemination 
of images and videos of animal abuse does not “intrinsically” compound 
that abuse.142 In other words, while animal abuse is illegal, the spread 
of materials documenting that abuse does not impose harm on the ani-
mals themselves, whereas the spread of child pornography exacerbates 
the harm felt by its victims. 
However, when the distribution of speech or material is not inte-
gral to an underlying harm, that speech is unlikely to garner a categor-
ical exemption from First Amendment protection. This notion is made 
clear in contrasting Ferber and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.143 In 
Ashcroft, the government sought to defend provisions of the Child Por-
nography Prevention Act of 1996 from a First Amendment challenge.144 
Although Ferber created a categorical exemption for the dissemination 
of child pornography, the provisions at issue in Ashcroft banned “child 
pornography that does not depict an actual child,” whether as “virtual 
child pornography” or as depictions that “appear to be” of minors engag-
ing in sexual conduct.145 The Court noted that such depictions “do not 
involve, let alone harm, any children in the production process” and 
scoffed that the statute’s literal terms could criminalize “a Renaissance 
painting depicting a scene from classical mythology.”146 Ultimately, 
criminalizing speech that merely appears to be child pornography is 
distinct from Ferber because it “records no crime and creates no victims 
by its production,” thus eliminating the “intrinsic[]” relationship be-
tween the distribution of child pornography and its harms.147 Because 
 
 141 Id. at 759. 
 142 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586. 
 143 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002). 
 144 Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1396. 
 145 Id. at 1397. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 1402. 
542 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
the production of child pornography that is not actually child pornogra-
phy does not in itself harm children, the law challenged in Ashcroft was 
not within the purview of Ferber. 
This nuanced distinction between the categorical exemption devel-
oped in Ferber and cases like Stevens and Ashcroft creates a framework 
to develop a First Amendment exemption for nonconsensual pornogra-
phy. Laws prohibiting the dissemination of child pornography in Ferber 
addressed the harms arising both from the creation and distribution of 
the material. In Stevens, the distribution of depictions of animal cruelty 
did not cause the animals to suffer any additional harm. In Ashcroft, 
there were no real victims harmed by the creation of virtual images who 
could be further harmed by their distribution. Conversely, the harms of 
nonconsensual pornography are rooted in its dissemination, and stat-
utes prohibiting that dissemination attempt to address the idea that 
such distribution creates victims. Undoubtedly, the creation of child 
pornography is far more sinister than the creation of sexually explicit 
images between adults, especially when such images are created con-
sensually within the confines of a romantic relationship. However, 
when images or videos are obtained without consent—in the form of 
voyeuristic upskirt videos, peephole videos, or depictions of sexual as-
saults—the creation of such material is itself a crime, and its dissemi-
nation exacerbates the harm to the victim.148 These cases create the 
closest analogue to Ferber and highlight a clear need for categorically 
exempting the dissemination of such material from First Amendment 
protection. 
But even when the sexually explicit material is initially created 
with the victim’s consent, the harm resulting from its nonconsensual 
distribution closely parallels that described in Ferber. The Court in Fer-
ber emphasized that the “materials produced are a permanent record of 
the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by 
their circulation.”149 Additionally, because of that harm, the value of the 
distribution of the material “is irrelevant to the child who has been 
abused.”150 In Ferber, the Court deferred to legislative judgment that 
“the use of children as subjects in pornographic materials is harmful to 
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child,” and that 
each step in the reproduction and dissemination of the material com-
pounds the trauma of the victim.151 Modern stories and studies about 
the impacts of revenge porn paint a similar picture: victims cannot es-
cape the presence of their explicit images, struggle to remove them from 
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web searches and social media, and find it nearly impossible to outrun 
their impact in professional and personal settings.152 Victims whose im-
ages are posted on sites catering to revenge porn are often harassed, 
stalked, and physically threatened.153 If anything, the intrinsic distri-
bution harms described in Ferber—decided nearly four decades ago—
are worsened exponentially by the use of modern technology to fuel re-
venge porn. Even when there is no harm in the consensual creation of 
a sexually explicit image, its nonconsensual dissemination online cre-
ates permanent repercussions for victims that can be at least as harm-
ful as those associated with child pornography. 
Thus, the Supreme Court could craft a categorical First Amend-
ment exemption to revenge porn that mirrors the approach it took to-
ward child pornography in Ferber. As the #MeToo Movement grows and 
stories of revenge porn’s harms come to the fore, evidence that the non-
consensual distribution of sexually explicit material bears “heavily and 
pervasively” on victims’ welfare is exceedingly strong. Victims of re-
venge porn are overwhelmingly young, female, LGBTQ, or members of 
another minority group, and their lives are forever changed by the dis-
semination of a single sexually explicit image.154 They suffer physical, 
financial, and emotional hardship as a result of the distribution of their 
images—that is, revenge porn attacks the welfare of its victims and of-
ten permanently impacts their lives. Moreover, the fear of dissemina-
tion of an explicit image is often an intrinsic part of an abusive relation-
ship insofar as the abuser will force the victim to stay in a relationship 
by threatening to share the material if the victim leaves.155 By the Su-
preme Court’s reasoning in Ferber—and an understanding, rooted in 
Lakier’s arguments, that the Court can and should create First Amend-
ment exemptions by weighing “the expressive value of speech against 
its social costs”156—there are strong reasons for the Supreme Court to 
create a new categorical exemption from First Amendment protection 
for revenge porn when the Court reviews the constitutionality of the 
revenge porn statutes. 
Finally, the Vermont Supreme Court in VanBuren details the com-
pelling argument that extreme invasions of privacy like revenge porn 
are “historically unprotected, but . . . not yet . . . specifically identified,” 
per Stevens.157 This means that, in addition to the bevy of practical and 
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policy implications that support stamping out revenge porn and curbing 
its impact on victims, the longstanding legal tradition of safeguarding 
privacy supports a categorical exemption for revenge porn as well. The 
Vermont court notes that the “Supreme Court has never struck down a 
restriction of speech on purely private matters that protected an indi-
vidual who is not a public figure from an invasion of privacy or similar 
harms.”158 Instead, the Supreme Court has considered the private and 
public interests at stake on a case-by-case basis.159 Even in cases where 
the Court upheld the free speech right, it was careful to not diminish 
privacy interests. For example, the Vermont court in VanBuren noted 
that the Supreme Court had never held “that truthful publication is 
automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of per-
sonal privacy within which the State may protect the individual from 
intrusion.”160 The lengthy legal history that supports a right to privacy 
even against First Amendment considerations thus provides an addi-
tional reason for the Supreme Court to draw a categorical exemption 
from First Amendment protection for nonconsensual pornography. Cou-
pled with the weight of the intrinsic “evil to be restricted” as described 
in Ferber, these clear historical standards create a strong case for the 
categorical exemption of revenge porn, even under the ostensibly re-
strictive framework laid out in Stevens. 
C.  Revenge Porn and Modern Conceptions of Consent 
Those hesitant to criminalize revenge porn present First Amend-
ment and practical concerns, but a categorical exemption for revenge 
porn would comport with modern understandings of consent in the #Me-
Too era. John Humbach’s 2014 article notes that revenge porn does not 
fall into the Supreme Court’s delineated categorical exceptions to the 
First Amendment and far more closely resembles “emotionally distress-
ing speech” that nonetheless receives full constitutional protection.161 
Further, Humbach argues that revenge porn laws prevent dissemina-
tion of true, albeit harmful, information.162 Thus, although revenge 
porn may lead to “definite individualized harm” for victims such as the 
loss of employment opportunities, the fact that it “conveys information 
that matters, at least to some people” should afford revenge porn First 
Amendment protection even if that information is harmful.163 Essen-
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tially, Humbach suggests that an employer evaluating a potential can-
didate—or anyone evaluating someone in a social setting—may want to 
know about conduct that reflects the character of that person, and the 
decision to take and send a nude photo may be useful information even 
if it harms the victim. 
But Humbach’s approach understates the harmful impact of re-
venge porn on its victims and conflates a personal decision to intimately 
share an explicit image with the experience of seeing one’s explicit im-
age disseminated without consent. Perhaps this argument would be 
stronger if the impacts of revenge porn were solely professional, but vic-
tims of revenge porn face stalking, harassment, and physical threats 
and abuse in addition to lasting economic and professional hardship. 
Those professional hardships should not be minimized, as women today 
struggle within the workplace to escape the cultural reach of sex dis-
crimination. Moreover, Humbach’s idea that criminalizing revenge 
porn restricts “the free flow of information concerning the activities that 
it reveals” narrows the importance of consent by suggesting that a vic-
tim’s proclivity to share photos within an intimate relationship “re-
veals” something worth knowing.164 To the extent that it does, there re-
mains a vital difference between knowing that someone shares explicit 
photos with an intimate partner and seeing the photos themselves. Cit-
ron and Franks aptly state that “[c]onsent to share information in one 
context does not serve as consent to share this information in another 
context. . . . Consent is contextual; it is not an on/off switch.”165 The ar-
gument for the Supreme Court to classify revenge porn as speech cate-
gorically exempt from full First Amendment protection is supported by 
the Court’s precedent and history. That support is not at all eroded by 
misguided suggestions that laws criminalizing revenge porn halt the 
free flow of truthful information. 
Finally, Humbach’s assertion wrongly minimizes the impact of ma-
terial that was not obtained consensually at all. In addition to conflat-
ing consensual creation with consensual distribution, this line of criti-
cism—much like state laws requiring a romantic relationship between 
the defendant and the victim—presents too narrow a conception of non-
consensual pornography. While “revenge porn” conjures up headlines 
about jilted exes, “[s]ometimes people surreptitiously film consensual 
sex acts, or even rapes, and make the footage public for reasons other 
than revenge.”166 Accordingly, the suggestion that revenge porn be cat-
egorically exempt from the First Amendment encompasses nonconsen-
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sual pornography of all stripes, including voyeuristic recordings, depic-
tions of nonconsensual sexual acts, and sexually explicit material 
shared coercively within the confines of an abusive relationship. The 
latter example is particularly confounding to Humbach’s conception of 
consent, since the exchange of sexually explicit materials is “often part 
of a pattern of coercive domestic abuse.”167 In that context, a victim’s 
choice to create an image may not be much of a choice at all, notwith-
standing the fact that such creation does not support dissemination. All 
told, nonconsensual pornography can have numerous origins and mech-
anisms of distribution, and material need not be created consensually 
to fall within the purview of an appropriate First Amendment categor-
ical exemption. 
D.  The Ill-Fitting Obscenity Exemption 
Rather than placing nonconsensual pornography in a new categor-
ical exemption from First Amendment protection, some scholars argue 
that revenge porn could fit within the obscenity exemption. Citron and 
Franks gesture toward the idea that “nonconsensual pornography can 
be seen as part of obscenity’s long tradition of proscription.”168 Other 
authors argue that, because the “Supreme Court respects each state’s 
‘long-recognized legitimate interest in regulating the use of obscene ma-
terial,’” lawyers defending state revenge porn statutes should try to 
classify them as obscene to garner an existing categorical exemption.169 
This argument notes that “prurience and patent offensiveness are ap-
parently permissible grounds on which to discriminate,” so revenge 
porn statutes that criminalize sexually explicit material can be con-
strued as criminalizing obscenity and thus avoid the hurdle of strict 
scrutiny review.170 
The problem with this argument is that the revenge porn statutes 
in question do not aim to restrain sexually explicit material itself but 
rather the conduct associated with its dissemination. Nonconsensual 
pornography is harmful not necessarily because the images exist in the 
first place, but because those images are disseminated. While an image 
obtained or created without consent is harmful on its own, many mod-
ern couples value the ability to consensually exchange intimate pho-
tos.171 Trying to place revenge porn laws under the categorical cover of 
the obscenity exemption misstates the aim of these statutes, which are 
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not geared toward criminalizing images but rather toward prohibiting 
the conduct associated with their nonconsensual distribution. Thus, 
this argument conflates the consensual and nonconsensual sharing of 
explicit images just as Humbach’s does and, if carried forward, may 
threaten the potency of revenge porn laws in addressing the actual 
harm of dissemination. The Vermont Supreme Court recognized the Su-
preme Court’s unwillingness to “shoehorn speech about violence into 
obscenity” in rejecting the suggestion in Brown that violent video games 
fit within that categorical exemption.172 The VanBuren Court’s obser-
vation that the “purposes underlying government regulation of obscen-
ity and of nonconsensual pornography are distinct [and] the defining 
characteristics of the regulated speech are accordingly quite different” 
wisely demonstrates that obscenity and revenge porn do not fit together 
under one First Amendment exemption.173 
E.  Overcoming the Strict Scrutiny Hurdle 
Creating a categorical exemption for revenge porn will provide clar-
ity to the messy picture of emerging statutes and protect them from 
strict scrutiny review. For now, absent word from the Supreme Court 
or a state court willing to create its own categorical exemption for non-
consensual pornography, statutes criminalizing revenge porn have to 
withstand strict scrutiny analysis if challenged in court. Some observ-
ers may argue that this status quo is not problematic. After all, state 
court decisions in Vermont and Texas—although reaching different con-
clusions—appear to offer relatively clear guidelines for how a statute 
can survive a legal challenge. The Texas statute was initially too broad 
because it did not require knowledge of the victim’s lack of consent or 
intent to do harm, thereby including in its sweep actors who may have 
shared images without clear criminal elements. The Vermont statute 
was upheld because it, as construed by the Vermont Supreme Court, 
required knowledge of the victim’s lack of consent as well as intent to 
do harm in disseminating an image.174 Thus, a revenge porn statute 
that simply looks like Vermont’s law and avoids the pitfalls of Texas’s 
original law should stand up in court. 
But not all legal challenges are so simple, and the forty-seven re-
venge porn laws enacted to date leave us with more questions than 
courts in Texas and Vermont may have answered. Although activists 
have made their case for states to adopt stringent laws prohibiting non-
consensual pornography, a survey of the enacted statutes shows a 
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sweepingly incoherent legal landscape. Citron and Franks offered nu-
merous clear and cogent suggestions in their 2014 article. Five years 
later, dozens of states have developed statutes that jumble intent to 
harm, knowledge of the lack of consent, actual harm, and the victim’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy. It remains unclear how these various 
legal thresholds will work together, and no one state law perfectly mir-
rors any other. Thus, notwithstanding persuasive policy recommenda-
tions from Citron, Franks, and other scholars who have tackled the is-
sue, state legislatures have made progress in implementing revenge 
porn laws but have done little to mitigate confusion surrounding them. 
Similarly, despite the ostensibly logical results in Jones and 
VanBuren, neither case seems to have resolved the law in its respective 
state. Instead, these decisions left scholars puzzled and the losing side 
contemplating appeals, meaning these battles may be far from over.175 
Further, the lack of uniformity of state laws likely means more lawsuits 
are coming, which will provide additional insight—and doubtless create 
additional questions—over criminal elements like intent to harm, ac-
tual harm, and the violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Ul-
timately, these questions seem destined to be resolved by the Supreme 
Court, but the wide array of state laws means that the high court’s take 
on revenge porn may depend significantly on the statute it confronts. 
Given this litany of lingering questions, legal activists should not rest 
on their laurels and merely hope that the ruling in VanBuren offers a 
blueprint for drafting a constitutional revenge porn law. Instead, they 
should push for a categorical exemption to full First Amendment pro-
tection for these laws in order to increase their impact and limit the 
legal hurdles to rooting out nonconsensual pornography. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Revenge porn is a uniquely twenty-first century phenomenon, ex-
acerbated by the sinister capabilities of modern technology and ampli-
fied by the #MeToo Movement’s engagement in new dialogues about re-
lationships, consent, and sexual abuse. To curb its harms, states have 
laudably begun implementing new laws criminalizing the nonconsen-
sual distribution of sexually explicit images. Yet, the most significant 
legal triumph over revenge porn would be classifying it as categorically 
exempt from the full protection of the First Amendment. Doing so would 
match the Supreme Court’s historical approach in evaluating low-value 
speech based on its harmful nature. In fact, the rationale underlying 
the Supreme Court’s decision to exempt the distribution of child por-
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nography from First Amendment protection is echoed in modern discus-
sions of revenge porn. Activists leading the charge against revenge porn 
should emphasize this connection. The need for a contemporary cate-
gorical exemption for revenge porn is bolstered by the pervasive threat 
to victims from online dissemination as well as modern understandings 
of consent in the #MeToo era. 
Conversely, trying to place nonconsensual pornography within the 
existing categorical exemption for obscenity or attempting to clarify a 
messy landscape of state statutes in hopes that they can survive strict 
scrutiny are unlikely to be successful approaches. The creation of a First 
Amendment categorical exemption for revenge porn will empower leg-
islators to curb this evil practice without running afoul of longstanding 
First Amendment jurisprudence. 
